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GIVING THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THE
COLD SHOULDER: THE IMPACT OF SANCHEZ-LLAMAS




"'Abroad,' that large home of ruined reputations."1 Although the
United States enjoys an enviable position of international superpower,
there still exists the need to maintain a "good neighbor" reputation. Im-
portantly, the United States' international relationships may depend on it.
A recent global poll shows that the worldwide opinion of the United States
is in rapid decline.' With 25 countries participating, nearly half of the more
than 26,000 poll respondents felt that the United States has a negative
worldwide impact.3
But what has led to this widespread downbeat view of the United
States? Much of the sentiment stems from the long-term U.S. activities in
the Middle East, although this is not the sole cause.4 Another source of
anti-American sentiment results from the United States' views toward in-
ternational tribunals.5 Some feel the United States acts hypocritically by
not showing deference to the International Court of Justice [hereinafter
"ICJ"], a tribunal that the United States at one time supported.6 This atti-
tude of hypocrisy was displayed yet again in the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.7 There, the Court
failed to give the ICJ's prior rulings regarding the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations [hereinafter "VCCR"] even the smallest amount of
"respectful consideration."8
By undertaking a cost-benefit analysis, this Note addresses the poten-
tial negative impact that Sanchez-Llamas and similarly decided cases may
have on the United States' international relations. Sanchez-Llamas' factual
summary is laid out in Part II. The background and history of the law
* The author would like to thank Professor Greg Bowman for his gracious instruction during
the research and writing of this Note. I also owe thanks to my Dad for his constant encouragement and
inspiration during all of my law school endeavors. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Todd
Butler for his willingness to read drafts of this Note and offer his thoughts and recommendations.
1. THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 269 (Angela Partington ed., Oxford Univ. Press
4th ed.1992).






7. 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).
8. Id. at 2683.
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surrounding the VCCR and the United States' treatment of Article 36 vio-
lations is examined in Part III. Part IV contains a synopsis of the Court's
opinion in Sanchez-Llamas, as well as a summary of Justice Ginsburg's con-
currence and Justice Breyer's dissent. Part V provides a cost-benefit analy-
sis of the potential impact that Sanchez-Llamas and the United States'
overall attitude toward VCCR violations may have on the United States'
international relationships. Finally, Part VI identifies potential solutions to
this problem.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts relevant to the instant case arise from two individual criminal
cases that were consolidated in the United States Supreme Court: State v.
Sanchez-Llamas9 and Bustillo v. Johnson.1° For clarity, each set of facts
will be discussed separately in Part II and will be consolidated in Part III
for an examination of the Court's analysis.
A. Facts of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
In December 1999, Moises Sanchez-Llamas [hereinafter "Sanchez-Lla-
mas"], a Mexican national, was arrested in Oregon following his involve-
ment in a shoot-out with police." At the time of his arrest, Sanchez-
Llamas was given Miranda2 warnings in both English and Spanish, but was
never advised of his right under the VCCR to have the Mexican consulate
informed of his arrest.; nor did local authorities ever notify the Mexican
consulate of Sanchez-Llamas' detention.' 3 During his post-arrest interro-
gation, Sanchez-Llamas made several incriminating statements about the
events surrounding his arrest. 4 Sanchez-Llamas subsequently was charged
in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Oregon with attempted aggravated
murder, attempted murder, and several other offenses.15
Before his trial, Sanchez-Llamas sought suppression of his incriminat-
ing statements on the basis that his statements were involuntary and that
authorities violated his VCCR rights.' 6 The trial court denied his motion
for suppression, determining that suppression was not the appropriate rem-
edy for the Article 36 violation.' 7 Thereafter, Sanchez-Llamas was con-
victed and sentenced to 246 months in prison.'8 On appeal, the Oregon
9. 338 Or. 267 (Or. 2005).
10. No. 2321-98-4, 2000 WL 365930 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2000).
11. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or. at 269.
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (The Court held that before a defendant could be
taken into custody and interrogated that he had the right to be informed of his right to remain silent,
right to counsel, and other rights. Failure to inform a defendant of such rights, the Court concluded,
properly may lead to suppression of any confession.)
13. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or. at 269.







Court of Appeals affirmed without issuing an opinion.1 9 The Oregon Su-
preme Court also affirmed.2 °
In its opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court held that "Article 36 of the
VCCR does not create rights that individual foreign nationals may assert in
a criminal proceeding. '21 The Court recognized that a treaty might provide
individual rights, either through its express language or by implication, but
qualified this recognition by stating that "an individual right of judicial en-
forcement will not be inferred from the mere fact that a treaty sets out
substantive rules of conduct that, if honored, would benefit individuals.
22
Since the Oregon Supreme Court determined Article 36 did not create in-
dividually enforceable rights, it did not address the issue of whether sup-
pression was an appropriate remedy for Article 36 violations.23
Following the Oregon Supreme Court's affirmation of his conviction,
Sanchez-Llamas filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, which the Court granted on November 7, 2005.24
B. Facts of Bustillo v. Johnson
On December 10, 1997, James Merry was fatally assaulted outside a
restaurant in Springfield, Virginia.25 The following day, Mario Bustillo
[hereinafter "Bustillo"], a Honduran national, was arrested in connection
with the assault after several bystanders identified him as the assailant.26
Bustillo was subsequently charged with the murder of James Merry, but
was never informed of his rights under Article 36 to have the Honduran
consulate informed of his arrest.27
Following a jury trial, Bustillo was convicted of murder and sentenced
to 30 years in prison.28 He filed a petition for appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, which denied the petition.29 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia also denied his appeal.3" Further, the United States Supreme Court
denied Bustillo's original petition for certiorari on June 4, 2001.31
Bustillo then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Virginia
state court, arguing for the first time that his Article 36 rights had been
violated.32 The state court dismissed Bustillo's petition on procedural
grounds because he had not properly raised the VCCR claim at trial.33 He
19. Oregon v. Sanchez-Llamas, 191 Or.App. 399 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
20. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or. at 277.
21. Id. at 269.
22. Id. at 274.
23. Id. at 276-77.
24. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 620 (2005).




29. Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 201879, 2003 WL 22518501 at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2676.
33. Id. at 2677.
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then filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition for habeas
corpus in the Circuit Court of Virginia, Fairfax County.34 When the circuit
court denied his motion to reconsider, Bustillo appealed the dismissal of
his petition to the Supreme Court of Virginia, where the Court affirmed the
dismissal." Bustillo then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court.36 There, Bustillo v. Johnson was consolidated with
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and certiorari was granted on November 7,
2005.37
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The Constitution of the United States of America provides guidelines
under which the United States government should enter into treaties with
foreign nations. First, Article II, Section 2 states, "[The President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties ... ,38 Further, Article III, Section 2 provides "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties
made ... ,3' Finally, Article VI declares "all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the Land."'4° Since its formation, the United States has entered into
treaties with foreign nations in accordance with this framework.
In entering into and governing treaties, countries often struggle to find
the proper balance between international law and domestic law. Generally
speaking, two major schools of thought have emerged-"monism" and
"dualism."41 Under the monism theory, domestic law and international
law are thought to be part of the same judicial system.42 In instances of
conflict, international law prevails over domestic law.43 Dualism, on the
other hand, views international and domestic law as two separate legal sys-
tems.44 A nation's domestic law is internally supreme, and international
law is involved only to the extent actually implemented into that nation's
body of law.45 Some academics recognize the benefits of a monist ap-
proach, but the prevailing U.S. attitude since the middle of the 20th century
has been dualist.46
34. Bustillo, 2003 WL 22518501 at *1.
35. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677.
36. Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S.Ct. 621 (2005).
37. Id. at 621.
38. U.S.CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51





46. Bradley, supra note 41, at 530.
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A. History of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Using his constitutionally granted authority, President Richard Nixon
led the United States to ratify the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions in 1969.4" The Convention was created to "contribute to the develop-
ment of friendly relations among the nations, irrespective of their differing
constitutional and social systems."48 Specifically, Article 36 of the VCCR
created rules to govern situations where a national of a signatory state had
been detained by authorities in another signatory state.4 9 The portions of
Article 36 relevant to this Note provide that when a signatory country de-
tains a national of another signatory country that the national shall, with-
out delay, be informed of his right to have the consulate of his home
country notified of his detention." Further, Article 36 requires that its
protections be enforced according to domestic law, so long as domestic law
gives full effect to the treaty provisions.51
In addition to ratifying the VCCR, the United States also adopted the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
which dictated that "[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. ..52 Although the United States is still a
party to the VCCR, it withdrew from the VCCR Optional Protocol in
2005.53
Every treaty falls into one of two categories pertaining to the method
with which the treaty becomes judicially enforceable-self-executing or
non-self-executing. 54 A self-executing treaty "operates of itself without the
aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given
authoritative effect by the courts."' 55 To the contrary, a non-self-executing
treaty is one which is enforceable domestically only after Congress has en-
acted a federal statute giving the treaty effect.56 In determining whether a
treaty is self-executing, courts generally look to the intent of the signato-
ries. The VCCR is a self-executing treaty, operating without any additional
legislation.57
47. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Dec. 14, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
[hereinafter VCCR].
48. VCCR, supra note 47.
49. VCCR, supra note 47, art. 36.
50. VCCR, supra note 47, art. 36.
51. VCCR, supra note 47, art. 36.
52. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, Jan. 29, 1970,
21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter VCCR Optional Protocol].
53. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2692 (2006) (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).
54. Bradley, supra note 42, at 539.
55. Askura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924)
56. Bradley, supra note 41, at 539-40.
57. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2694 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing S. Exec. Rep. No. 91-9, at
5)(1969)).
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B. The United States and the International Court of Justice
Following World War II and the formation of the United Nations, the
International Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ") was created to serve as
the arbiter of disputes among member nations.58 The United States, along
with China, the USSR and the United Kingdom, was a major player in the
formation of the ICJ.5 9 In 1964, President Harry Truman signed a declara-
tion on behalf of the United States recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ.60 In so doing, the United States joined other member nations
who adhered to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
61
The United States' adherence to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction,
however, lasted only until the United States anticipated an adverse ICJ
ruling against it involving a conflict in Nicaragua. In 1984, Nicaragua
brought an action against the United States in the ICJ alleging that the
United States was "using military force against Nicaragua and intervening
in Nicaragua's internal affairs.",62 When the ICJ determined that it had
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the United States not only declined to par-
ticipate in further proceedings on the matter, but also terminated its 1964
declaration of compulsory jurisdiction.63 Moreover, in 1986, when the ICJ
handed down its decision on the merits holding the United States in viola-
tion of the treaties in question, the United States did not take any action to
modify its activities. 6 The United States' behavior in this situation marked
the beginning of a U.S. pattern of failing to give even "respectful considera-
tion" to the ICJ and its rulings.
Despite its heavy involvement in the creation of the ICJ, the United
States has a history of indifference to ICJ rulings. The case of Breard v.
Greene is a prime example. In Breard, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
follow an ICJ ruling mandating a stay of the execution of a Paraguayan
national pending the outcome of his claim of Article 36 violation.65 In that
case, Angel Francisco Breard was convicted of attempted rape and capital
murder in Virginia and sentenced to death.66 Following affirmation of his
conviction by the Virginia Supreme Court and denial of certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court, Breard filed a motion for habeas relief in
federal court.67 There, he argued, for the first time, that his conviction
should be overturned based on the violation of his rights under Article 36
58. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO.
L.J. 535, 536 (1993).
59. Int'l Court of Justice [ICJ], Handbook, at 18, available at http://www.I.C.J.-cij/I.C.J.www/
igeneralinformation/ibleubook.pdf
60. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 292
(4th ed. 2003).
61. Id. at 291-92.
62. Id. at 296 (quoting Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nic-
aragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Rep. 392 (1984)).
63. Id. at 303-04.
64. Id. at 308.
65. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).




of the VCCR.6 s The district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
both concluded that Breard waived his Article 36 claim because he had not
raised it in state court, and that he could not meet the requirements of
cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default.69
Shortly after Breard filed his habeas claim in federal court,
Paraguayan officials instituted a claim against Virginian officials, also alleg-
ing violations of their citizens' Article 36 rights.70 The district court and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals both declined to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.7' The United States Supreme Court consoli-
dated the actions.72
In addition to the United States court proceedings, Paraguay started
proceedings in the International Court of Justice.73 There, Paraguay once
again raised the Article 36 violations.74 The ICJ recognized jurisdiction
and ordered that Breard's execution be stayed until completion of the pro-
ceedings in the ICJ.75 Seeking to enforce the ICJ's order to stay execution,
Breard and Paraguay filed motions in the United States Supreme Court.76
The Supreme Court ultimately denied all petitions for certiorari and all
motions filed by Breard and Paraguay.77 Later, in violation of the ICJ's
order, Breard was executed as scheduled.78
The Supreme Court based its refusal to follow the ICJ ruling on two
main premises.79 First, the Court determined that it was required only to
give "respectful consideration" to the ICJ's interpretation of the treaty be-
cause domestic procedural laws govern treaty implementation.8" Further,
the Court noted that Vienna Convention violations deserve the same treat-
ment as US constitutional violations-they are defaulted if not raised at
trial.8 '
In 2001, the United States again failed to give "respectful considera-
tion" to an ICJ ruling in The LaGrand Case.8 2 In LaGrand, Germany filed
an action against the United States in the ICJ alleging violations of Walter
LaGrand's Article 36 rights.83 The ICJ ordered the United States to cease
68. Id.
69. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D.Va. 1996); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615,
620 (4th Cir. 1998).
70. Breard, 523 U.S. at 374.
71. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996); Republic of Para-
guay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).





77. Id. at 378-79.
78. Bradley, supra note 41, at 538.
79. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 376.
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execution proceedings of LaGrand pending finalization of the ICJ proceed-
ing.84 Like in Breard, however, the defendant was executed notwithstand-
ing the ICJ's order.8 5
Following LaGrand's execution, the action in the ICJ continued, with
the ICJ ultimately concluding that the United States had breached its obli-
gations under the VCCR to provide notification of the right to consular
assistance.86 The ICJ held that Article 36 created individual rights and that
a state's procedural default rules should not be allowed to prevent "full
effect" of Article 36.87
The United States' pattern of defiance continued in 2004, in the ICJ
action of Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.8 8 In
Avena, Mexico alleged that the United States had violated the VCCR
rights of over 50 Mexican nationals scheduled to be executed. 89 The ICJ
ruled in favor of Mexico, but the United States failed to take the remedial
measures ordered by the ICJ.9 0
In sum, since its creation, the role of the ICJ has been less influential
than originally envisioned due to some signatory states refusing to adhere
to its rulings.91 To that end, the court's decisions have not been well
respected because there currently are no enforcement mechanisms for
those countries refusing to follow ICJ rulings.92
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Chief Justice Roberts' Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court's opinion in Sanchez-Lla-
mas, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Rob-
erts addressed three main issues. First was whether Article 36 of the
VCCR created judicially enforceable rights for individuals in a criminal
trial or post conviction proceeding.93 Second was whether, in the instance
of an Article 36 violation, suppression of evidence would be the appropri-
ate remedy.94 Third, was whether a state would be permitted to apply its
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 310-11.
87. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The International
Court of Justice in Mexico v. United States (Avena) Speaks Emphatically to the Supreme Court of the
United States About the Fundamental Nature of the Right to Consul, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (2004).
88. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico. v. United States), 2004 I.C.J.
No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31)
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 540-
41 (4th ed. 2003).
92. Id. at 541.
93. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006).
94. Id. at 2674.
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procedural default rules to claims of Article 36 violations.95 The five-jus-
tice majority concluded that "even assuming the Convention creates judi-
cially enforceable rights, that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for
a violation of Article 36, and that a State may apply its regular rules of
procedural default to Article 36 claims."
9 6
1. Does Article 36 create individually enforceable rights?
Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo both asserted they had individual rights
that were judicially enforceable under the VCCR.97 Respondents and the
United States, as amicus curiae, both argued that the Convention does not
automatically grant individually enforceable rights because "there is a pre-
sumption that a treaty will be enforced through political and diplomatic
channels, rather than through the courts."9 Determining that the petition-
ers were not entitled to relief regardless of the answer, the Sanchez-Llamas
Court expressly declined to decide whether the VCCR creates individual
rights for defendants in a criminal proceeding.99 In order to answer the
remaining two questions, Justice Roberts proceeded on the assumption
that the VCCR does create individual rights enforceable by criminal
defendants.100
2. Is suppression the proper remedy for Article 36 violations?
Proceeding under the assumption that Article 36 granted individual
rights to the petitioners, Justice Roberts then addressed Sanchez-Llamas'
suppression argument.10 1 In particular, Sanchez-Llamas urged that sup-
pression was the proper remedy for the Oregon authorities' violation of his
Article 36 rights.
10 2
As a preliminary matter, Justice Roberts noted that the plain language
of the VCCR does not provide an express remedy for Article 36 violations,
but instead "expressly leaves the implementation of Article 36 to domestic
law," 103 In fact, the majority noted, "[i]t would be startling if the Conven-
tion were read to require suppression," since suppression is almost com-
pletely unrecognized by the other signatories to the treaty. 10 4 Since the
VCCR itself does not require suppression, Justice Roberts then looked at
whether domestic law requires suppression. 10 5 Sanchez-Llamas argued the
Court should rule that suppression is the appropriate remedy for Article 36
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2677.
98. Id. (quoting Brief for United States 11).
99. Sanchez-Llamas,126 S.Ct. at 2677.
100. Id. at 2677-78.
101. Id. at 2678.
102. Id.
103. Id. The majority noted the "startling" result should the Vienna Convention require suppres-
sion, calling suppression "an entirely American legal creation." If the VCCR required suppression as a
remedy, other countries that do not even recognize suppression under their own domestic law would be
required to provide it defendants in instances of Article 36 violations.
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. ld. at 2679.
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violations, based on its authority to develop judicial remedies to enforce
federal law in state-court proceedings. 10 6 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, distinguishing the cases cited by Sanchez-Llamas on the grounds that
they pertained only to federal courts and concluding that it lacked supervi-
sory authority to fashion remedies in state court criminal proceedings." 7
As such, the Court declined to create a remedy for Article 36 violations,
absent express authority granted by the VCCR to do so. l 0s
Since the VCCR neither contained an express remedy nor granted the
Court authority to impose a remedy on state courts, Justice Roberts next
looked to see whether the VCCR contained an implied judicial remedy.
Specifically, Sanchez-Llamas argued that the Article 36 requirement that
domestic law "must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for [Arti-
cle 36]" implies a remedy-whether it be suppression or some other rem-
edy."'0 9 The Court rejected this argument, primarily on the basis that there
was insufficient evidence that other signatories have found the "full effect"
language to imply a remedy."10
Even if an implied remedy existed, Justice Roberts maintained that
suppression would not be the appropriate remedy.'' The Court noted
that, under domestic law, the exclusionary rule is used only in very limited
circumstances, primarily to deter constitutional violations with Fourth and/
or Fifth Amendment implications." 2 The Court further rationalized that
use of the exclusionary rule in the instant case was not proper because
violations of Article 36 have no Fourth or Fifth Amendment issues.
113
More pointedly, the Court reasoned that Article 36 does not involve
searches or interrogations and does not guarantee defendants assistance
from the consul, but merely grants them a right to have the consul
informed.
114
Rejecting Sanchez-Llamas' argument that the Article 36 violation de-
prived him of complete knowledge of his legal options, Justice Roberts
106. Id. (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 04-10566, p. 11).
107. Id. The Court noted that its authority in the cases cited by Sanchez-Llamas was based on its
authority over federal courts, not over state courts.
108. Id. The Court concluded that it would be a violation of separation of powers to develop a
judicial remedy without the express authority of the VCCR to do so.
109. Id. (quoting Art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T., at 101) (emphasis added by opinion). The Court casts
doubt on the argument that there is an implied remedy by noting "there is little indication that other
parties to the Convention have interpreted Article 36 to require a judicial remedy in the context of
criminal prosecutions." Id. (citing Department of State Answers to Questions Posed by the First Cir-
cuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li, No. 97-2034 etc., p. A-9, 1999 WL 33891052 (Oct. 15, 1999)).
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2681.
113. Id.
114. Id. Additionally, the Court concluded that the reasons behind suppression of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment violations are not present in an Article 36 violation. Often, confessions gained in
violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments are not reliable. Additionally, violations of Fourth or
Fifth Amendments often give law enforcement an advantage over the defendant. Here, however, the
Court determined that the confession gained from Sanchez-Llamas in this case was probably reliable,
despite his being unaware of his Article 36 rights. Further, law enforcement probably does not gain any
practical advantage over the defendant from an Article 36 violation.
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opined that domestic law adequately protected Sanchez-Llamas.' 15 Specif-
ically, the Court determined that Article 36 did not substantially add to
Sanchez-Llamas' legal options because he never lost his due process rights
to an attorney and protection against self-incrimination.
116
Concluding its suppression analysis, the majority noted that suppres-
sion would not have been the only possible remedy for the Article 36 viola-
tions.1 7 Sanchez-Llamas could have argued that his statements made to
authorities were involuntary and advanced the Article 36 violation as evi-
dence of this argument.1 8 Further, had he raised the violation at trial, the
trial court would have aided him in receiving consular help." 9
3. Can states apply their own procedural default rules to Article 36
claims?
After deciding Sanchez-Llamas' portion of the case, the Court turned
to Bustillo's argument that claims of an Article 36 violation trump a state's
procedural default rules.120 The Court, relying primarily on its holding in
Breard v. Greene,12 rejected Bustillo's argument and concluded that a
state may apply its own procedural default rules to claims of Article 36
violations.
122
Recalling its decision in Breard, the Court reiterated its two bases for
determining that Article 36 does not trump state procedural default
rules. 123 First, "absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the
treaty in that State."' 24 Second, state procedural default rules apply to
even constitutional claims and should likewise apply to claims of treaty
violations.
125
The Court then explained its rejection of Bustillo's call to the Court to
reconsider its holding in Breard in light of the newer ICJ holdings in
LaGrand and Avena that state procedural default rules do not apply to
Article 36 claims. 126 Relying on its own constitutional authority, the struc-
ture and purpose of the ICJ, and the United State's recent withdrawal from
the Optional Protocol concerning Vienna Convention disputes, the Court
determined that it is not bound to follow ICJ rulings. 27 The majority ac-
knowledged, however, that the ICJ's decisions, although not binding, are
115. Id. at 2681-82.





121. 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
122. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2682.
123. Id. at 2682-83.
124. Id. (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1988) (per curiam)).
125. Id. at 2683 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1988) (per curiam)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2683-86.
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entitled to "respectful consideration." '128 The Court nonetheless declined
to revisit Breard.
a29
Bustillo also attempted to argue that procedural default rules take
away any "legal significance" of Article 36 violations. 130 Even so, the
Court rejected this argument as well, noting that procedural default rules
often take away legal significance from otherwise valid claims."'
Although it declined to adhere to the ICJ's holdings in Avena and
LaGrand, the Court discussed how the ICJ's interpretation runs contrary
to an adversarial system of justice.' 32 Noting that the adversarial system is
centered on a party's burden to do what is best for him, the Court deter-
mined that a rule that Article 36 claims can trump state procedural rules
would be too broad. 133 Not only would the rule in question be trumped,
but also would other procedural default rules such as statutes of limitations
and other limits on filings.
134
The Court compared Article 36 claims with claims of violations of Mi-
randa135 rights. 136 Notably, the Court pointed out that even claims of Mi-
randa violations are waived if not raised at trial. 137 Likewise, the same
standard should apply to Article 36 claims.
13
B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, but joined Part II of the
dissent. Acknowledging that "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants
rights that may be invoked by an individual in a judicial proceeding," Jus-
tice Ginsburg nonetheless determined that Sanchez-Llamas did not war-
rant suppression or overriding of a state's procedural default rules. 139
Justice Ginsburg declined to join the dissent in full because it was her opin-
ion that Justice Breyer's dissent went beyond the scope of the cases before
the Court.
140
Regarding the suppression issue, Justice Ginsburg first dispelled the
dissent's picture of foreign nationals who do not understand their Miranda
rights being questioned by authorities.' 41 She noted that Sanchez-Llamas
had lived in the United States for 11 years and understood his Miranda
rights, which he received in both English and Spanish.142 She remarked
128. Id. at 2683 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1988) (per curiam)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2685.




135. Miranda, supra note 11.
136. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2687.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2687.
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that in Justice Breyer's picture, the defendant would not even need VCCR
protection because he would have a cause of action based on his Miranda
rights.
143
Moreover, she noted, Article 36 does not require authorities to contact
the consul immediately, nor does it require questioning to be suspended
until the consul has responded.'" Justice Ginsburg reasoned that, since
Article 36 does not provide these protections, suppression is improper.
45
She pointed out that neither the VCCR itself nor any of its signatories have
allowed for suppression, and that the dissent failed to cite a single case
where suppression was granted solely for an Article 36 violation.
1 46
Regarding the procedural default rule issue, Ginsburg began by point-
ing out two inconsistencies in Bustillo's reasoning. First, she joined the ma-
jority's contention that it would be unfair to subject Miranda violations but
not Article 36 violations to procedural default rules. 147 Second, she recog-
nized that a federal statute could supersede the VCCR.14 8
A critical point in Justice Ginsburg's analysis stemmed from the fact
that Bustillo's attorney knew throughout his trial of Bustillo's rights under
Article 36.149 She reasoned that since the State's actions did nothing to bar
Bustillo from raising his Article 36 claim at trial, the first condition for
overriding a procedural default rule was not met.
15 0
In closing, Ginsburg explained that "if there are some times when a
Convention violation, standing alone, might warrant suppression, or the
displacement of a State's ordinarily applicable procedural default rules,
neither Sanchez-Llamas' case nor Bustillo's belongs in that category. "151
C. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter and by
Justice Ginsburg in part. Focusing on the same three questions raised by
the majority, the dissent began with a discussion of the history and purpose
behind the VCCR, noting the United States' recent withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol.1 52 Justice Breyer also discussed two ICJ cases that were
decided in the years since Breard-LaGrand and Avena. Justice Breyer
interpretations of the ICJ key holdings since Breard are as follows:
(1) that the Convention obligates a member nation to in-
form an arrested foreign national without delay that he may
contact his consulate; (2) that the Convention requires the
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2689 (citing Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico. v. United




148. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2689.
149. Id. at 2690.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2691-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
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United States to provide some process for its courts to 're-
view and reconside[r]' criminal convictions where there has
been a prejudicial violation of this obligation; and (3) that
this 'review and reconsideration' cannot be foreclosed on
the ground that the foreign national did not raise the viola-
tion at trial where the authorities' failure to inform the for-
eign national of his rights prevented him from timely raising
his claim.153
In Justice Breyer's opinion, the majority's holding in Sanchez-Llamas
is in direct conflict with these recent holdings of the ICJ and fails to give
the ICJ the "respectful consideration" to which it is entitled.15"
1. Does the VCCR create individually enforceable rights?
Beginning his analysis, Justice Breyer addressed the question that the
majority declined to answer-whether the VCCR creates individually en-
forceable rights. Noting that this question has plagued courts for some
time, Justice Breyer answered, "a criminal defendant may, at trial or in a
postconviction proceeding, raise the claim that state authorities violated
the Convention.
155
In determining that the VCCR creates individual rights, Justice Breyer
relied first on the Head Money Cases.1 56 The Head Money Cases, in decid-
ing whether a treaty was to be given effect of a law passed by Congress,
looked to the nature of the treaty.1 57 There are two primary questions to
be answered in determining whether a treaty is to be given the effect of
Congressional law: "Does the Convention 'prescribe a rule by which the
rights of the private citizen . . may be determined'? Are the obligations
set forth in Article 36(1)(b) 'of a nature to be enforced in a court of
justice'?
158
Justice Breyer concluded that the nature of the VCCR indicated that it
was the type to be enforced in judicial proceedings by individuals.159 Arti-
cle 36 involves rights of arrested or detained foreign nationals, such as the
right to have the consul informed of his arrest and the right to have com-
munication to the consul promptly forwarded on his behalf. 16° The dissent
reasoned that these are procedural rights not unlike those that courts
commonly enforce. 161 Furthermore, Article 36 addresses the "rights" of
individual foreign nationals as opposed to other sections that speak of
"rights" of member nations or consul officials. 162
153. Id. at 2693 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
154. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2695-96.
155. Id. at 2691 (emphasis added).









In showing that the language of Article 36 intended to create an indi-
vidual right, Justice Breyer drew a parallel between Article 36 and a hypo-
thetical pre-Miranda federal statute. 163 He pointedly stated that a federal
statute reading "shall inform a detained person without delay of his right to
counsel" would surely be read to create a law that a defendant could raise
at trial. 164 Likewise, he concluded that Article 36 should also be read to
create individually enforceable rights.' 65 As added support, Justice Breyer
cited prior Supreme Court cases where individuals were permitted to in-
voke treaty provisions.
166
Further supporting the argument that the VCCR creates individual
rights, Justice Breyer examined the ICJ's prior holdings in Avena and
LaGrand, which both held that an individual might invoke rights under the
VCCR.1 67 He argued that although the majority acknowledged that the
ICJ is entitled to "respectful consideration," the majority declined to pro-
vide this required level of deference.
161
After distinguishing the cases relied upon by the majority for the pro-
position that there is a presumption against a treaty creating individual
rights, Justice Breyer noted his unawareness of another nation that has
found that the VCCR does not create individual rights.' 69 Further, he
agreed that Executive Branch's interpretation of treaty is entitled to great
weight, but acknowledged that it is not conclusive. 7 ° Justice Breyer con-
cluded Part II by reaffirming that the language, nature of the rights, and
the ICJ's interpretation all point to individual rights. 7 '
2. Do a state's procedural default rules apply to Article 36 violations?
Turning to the issue of whether a state's procedural default rules
should apply to claims of Article 36 violations, the dissent answered,
"sometimes state procedural default rules must yield to the Convention's
insistence that domestic laws 'enable full effect to be given to the purposes
for which" Article 36's "rights ... are intended.' " 7 2 Justice Breyer's read-
ing of the "full effect" language of Article 36 is that:
A State's ordinary procedural default rules apply unless (1)
the defendant's failure to raise a Convention matter (e.g.,
that police failed to inform him of his Article 36 rights) can
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 687 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2695. . (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410-411
(1886); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2697.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2698 (citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
171. Id.
172. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2691 (quoting Art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T., at 101) (emphasis in
original).
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itself be traced to the failure of the police (or other govern-
mental authorities) to inform the defendant of those Con-
vention rights, and (2) state law does not provide any other
effective way for the defendant to raise that issue (say,
through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 73
To support this interpretation of Article 36, Justice Breyer focused pri-
marily on prior decisions of the ICJ, t7 4 although he devoted some discus-
sion to the express language of Article 36 17 and its drafting history.176
First, Justice Breyer interpreted the prior decisions of the ICJ to hold
that "the Convention simply [requires] an effective remedy."'17 7 He noted
that the ICJ did not require that countries provide any specific remedy.
178
Furthermore, he acknowledged that state procedural default rules are only
forbidden if there is no effective remedy for an Article 36 violation.
179
Next, the dissent acknowledged the majority's point that it is not
bound by the ICJ's holdings.' He focused considerably, however, on the
requirement that U.S. courts give "respectful consideration" to ICJ hold-
ings.181 Justice Breyer decided that the majority did not give the needed
deference to the ICJ. 182 Justice Breyer reasoned that more deference is
entitled to the ICJ because the ICJ has extensive experience with trea-
ties.18 3 He pointed further to the Supreme Court's and other lower courts'
prior cases where the ICJ was given considerable deference.'
8 4
When countering the majority's foundation for its opinion, Justice
Breyer asserted that the majority misinterpreted the prior holdings of the
ICJ by reading them "as creating an extreme rule of law," rather than "in
light of the Convention's underlying language and purposes." 85 Reading
the ICJ's opinions in this manner, the dissent argued, was actually contrary
to the respectful consideration desired.
186
173. Id. at 2698.
174. Id. at 2698-99.
175. Justice Breyer reasoned that his conclusion is supported by Article 36's two requirements
that (1) its rights be "exercised in conformity with" the laws and regulations of the detaining country
and (2) that the host country's laws and regulations give "full effect " to Article 36's purposes.
176. The original draft of Article 36 contained "not nullify" in place of "full effect." When "full
effect" was suggested to replace "not nullify," opponents of the change argued that "full effect" would
"modify the criminal law and regulations or the criminal procedure of the receiving state." (quoting 1
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Official Records, Summary records of plenary
meetings and of the meetings of the First and Second Committees, U.N. Doc. AICONF.25/16, $ 26, p.
38 (1963) (statement of Romania). Justice Breyer reasoned that by adopting the "full effect" language
that the drafters intended Article 36 to modify the host country's criminal procedure.





182. Id. at 2702.
183. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2700-01.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2702-03.
186. Id. at 2703.
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He next examined the majority's reliance on Breard v. Greene, deter-
mining that Breard should not control in the instant case. 187 Justice Breyer
distinguished Breard on the basis that it concerned federal, rather than
state law.188 He provided as further support that Breard is not controlling
that (1) the ICJ holdings in question were decided after Breard and (2)
Breard was a per curiam decision that was decided in a very time-sensitive
situation. 189 He argued that Breard should be modified because its pre-
sumption against the VCCR ever trumping state procedural default rules in
the absence of an express statement is based on case law that does not
reach the same conclusion.1 90
Justice Breyer concluded by addressing the argument that Article 36
should not be entitled to better treatment than the United States Constitu-
tion by stating "nations are of course free to agree to grant one another's
citizens protections that differ from the protections enjoyed by citizens at
home."'1 91 Based on the foregoing analysis, the dissent recommended a re-
mand to the state court for the state to determine whether an appropriate
remedy would be available.' 92
3. Is suppression an appropriate remedy?
Like the question of whether Article 36 should ever trump a state's
procedural default rules, Justice Breyer also concluded that the answer to
whether suppression is an appropriate remedy for Article 36 violations is
"sometimes."' 93 He admitted that the VCCR does not provide for auto-
matic exclusion but argued that if suppression is the only appropriate rem-
edy that it should be allowed.'94
The dissent rejected the majority's assertion that a defendant's rights
are adequately protected under domestic law by introducing the image of a
foreign national who does not speak English.' 95 Justice Breyer asserted
that it might be prejudicial to that defendant who may not be familiar with
the American criminal justice system.1 96 By not giving him his Article 36
rights, the defendant may be prejudiced.' 97 He rejected Justice Ginsburg's
argument that the defendant always has another cause of action by showing
that the confession was involuntary.198
Next, the dissent rejected the majority's idea that suppression is "en-
tirely American."' 199 Addressing the majority's argument that it would be a
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2704.
189. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2704.
190. Id. at 2705.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2706.
194. Id.
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startling result to allow suppression as a remedy, Justice Breyer argued that
it is not startling because the VCCR left it up to countries to decide the
proper remedy.2° Justice Breyer listed cases in countries where suppres-
sion has been utilized as a remedy.2 °a
V. ANALYSIS
The United States' disregard of the ICJ's rulings, most recently
Sanchez-Llamas, is quite clear. As Justice Breyer discussed in his Sanchez-
Llamas dissent, the United States Supreme Court's decision in that case is
in direct conflict with the recent prior ICJ rulings in Avena and
LaGrand.20 2 As discussed above, the ICJ specifically decided in those two
cases that the VCCR creates individually enforceable rights, and that a
state's procedural default rules might not bar review of a defendant's case.
Despite these clear rulings, the Sanchez-Llamas Court nonetheless applied
its procedural default rules to bar Bustillo's Article 36 claim and refused to
provide a remedy for the VCCR violations suffered by Sanchez-Llamas
and Bustillo.
One scholar has commented that "[t]he attitude of the United States
towards international adjudication seems to have reached another low
point. '' 2 3 It is undisputed that the United States is not bound by the rul-
ings of the International Court of Justice. It also is clear from the history of
its treatment of ICJ decisions that the United States is unwilling to defer to
those rulings.
Regardless of whether one favors a monistic or dualistic approach to
international law, potential negative impacts of the Sanchez-Llamas deci-
sion can be seen. Indeed, choosing not to give the ICJ "respectful consid-
eration" has identifiable costs. By refusing to comply with the ICJ's rulings
throughout history, the United States apparently has undertaken a cost-
benefit analysis, with its recent behavior indicating that it views its judicial
independence-the only identifiable benefit-as outweighing any social
and economic costs. Admittedly, it may be difficult to quantify the costs
associated with choosing not to give deference to ICJ rulings, but it is none-
theless important to recognize them. This Note focuses on the two most
obvious negative impacts-reputation and reciprocity.
A. Reputation
Although the Sanchez-Llamas majority acknowledged that the ICJ
was entitled to "respectful consideration," it failed to provide even the
smallest level of deference to that tribunal. By not showing any deference
200. Id. at 2707.
201. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2707.
202. See supra, part IV.
203. Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudica-
tion, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783, 784 (2004).
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to the ICJ, the United States is sending a message that it thinks it is supe-
rior to the other signatories who have taken measures to follow the ICJ's
rulings.
Globally, foreign nations' opinions of the United States have declined
in the past two years.20 4 In fact, two years ago 40% of respondents said
that U.S. had a positive global influence.2 °5 That number is currently down
to 29%.206 This is due largely to the United States' current situation in
Iraq.2 °7 Steve Krull, director of the Program on International Policy Atti-
tudes, attributes this decline "to a growing perception of 'hypocrisy' on the
part of the United States in such areas as cooperation with the United Na-
tions and other international bodies., 20 8 However, Krull also noted that
the negative feelings are not based solely on Iraq-"The reaction tends to
be: 'You were a champion of a certain set of rules. Now you are breaking
your own rules, so you are being hypocritical."'
20 9
The United States' hypocritical behavior is evidenced in part by its
prior interactions with Nicaragua, Iran and Syria.210 There, "the United
States demanded access to its citizens pursuant to the very provisions of the
Vienna Conventions it chooses to ignore when the situation is reversed."
'21
This "do as I say, not as I do" attitude only worsens the global perception
of the United States.
As discussed earlier, the United States was a leader in the creation of
the International Court of Justice. Now, by disregarding its rulings, the
United States is acting hypocritically. The Sanchez-Llamas Court should
have taken the case as an opportunity to revisit Breard and render a ruling
in accordance with the ICJ. However, the Court succeeded only in af-
firming the world's negative view of the United States.
B. Reciprocity
In international law, reciprocity must also be considered.212 When one
party breaches its obligations under a treaty, the harmed party is "entitled
to take countermeasures, called 'retorsion' in international law, by sus-
pending the same right or duty against the breaching party. '21 3 As such,
204. Kevin Sullivan, Views on U.S. Drop Sharply in Worldwide Opinion Poll, WASHINGTON POST,
January 23, 2007 at A14.






210. Emily Deck Harrill, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and a Remedy in Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REV 569, 584 (2004) (citing United States v.
Superville, 40 F.Supp.2d 672, 676 n. 3 (1999); William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 268 (1998)).
211. Harrill, supra note 205.
212. Asa W. Markel, International Law and Consular Immunity, 43 Arizona Attorney, 22, January
2007.
213. Markel, supra note 207 (citing JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 398-99 (Sir
Humphrey Waldock ed., Oxford 6th ed. 1963)).
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when a visitor to the United States is deprived his rights under the VCCR
and not given any remedy, the damaged country is equally able to treat
American citizens in the same manner.214
The right to consulate assistance is extremely important to American
citizens traveling abroad. In fact, American Citizens Abroad, a non-profit
organization, has explained that a large number of US citizens travel
abroad each year, many of whom find themselves involved in a foreign
nation's criminal justice system.2 15 Access to consular assistance is ex-
tremely important to help these American travelers navigate an unfamiliar
system.216 Indeed, the United States Department of State even recognizes
the extreme need for American citizens to have access to consul while trav-
eling abroad, explaining that "'[n]o one needs [this] cultural bridge more
than the individual U.S. citizen who has been arrested in a foreign country
or imprisoned in a foreign jail."' 217
One judge has noted, "United States citizens are scattered about the
world-as missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and stu-
dents, as travelers for business and for pleasure. Their freedom and safety
are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Conven-
tion and other nations follow their example., 218 Additionally, "U.S. courts
should follow the primary reasoning behind [ICJ rulings], namely that Arti-
cle 36 provides an important cultural bridge for a detained foreign national,
helping him to overcome numerous cultural, linguistic, social and logistical
barriers. "219
In addition to creating the potential for American international trav-
elers to be denied their VCCR rights, the United States' lack of deference
to the ICJ may well disrupt other areas of international relations.220 For
instance, if violations of Article 36 become commonplace, signatory coun-
tries may well begin to violate other VCCR provisions.221 This breakdown
in diplomatic and consular relations may adversely impact economic and
political relations among signatory countries.222
The United States' behavior, as evidenced by its recent ruling in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, has the potential to diminish the rights of
American travelers abroad and to negatively affect economic and political
relations. By failing to give full effect to the rights granted under Article
214. Id.
215. Houston A. Stokes, Broadening Executive Power in the Wake of Avena: An American Inter-
pretation of Pacta Sunt Servanda, Note, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219, 1235-36 (quoting Brief for
American Citizens Abroad (ACA) as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Ex Parte Medellin,
No. Ap-75, 207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005)).
216. Id.
217. Harrill, supra note 205 (quoting William C. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 268 (1998)).
218. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring).
219. Kadish, supra note 89.
220. William C. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,





36, the United States is opening itself and its international visitors to the
same treatment abroad.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States continues to discount the value of international re-
lations today. Another recent situation where the United States has cho-
sen its independence over cooperation with other nations relates to the
Kyoto Protocol.223 The Kyoto Protocol recently was implemented interna-
tionally to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.224 The United States declined
to join the Protocol, choosing instead to regulate emissions through in-
creased taxes.225 The United States' decision against joining the Kyoto
Protocol has resulted in some political backlash.22' However, insufficient
time has passed to determine whether the actual costs of not complying will
outweigh the benefits.
The potential costs of failing to give deference to the ICJ are apparent.
By doing so, the United States not only damages its reputation among its
international neighbors, but also threatens the fair treatment of its citizens
abroad. These potential risks may well outweigh any the benefit of judicial
independence.
The question now remains of how to address this recurring problem.
Should we revise the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to provide
for a specific remedy for violations of Article 36? Or should we enact a
domestic statute that would provide for a specific remedy? Revising the
VCCR may be problematic because it would require active involvement of
all signatory nations-nations that may not perceive a problem with the
current state of the treaty. Enacting a relevant domestic statue to provide
for a specific remedy may be the proper answer. This, however, would
require the Court to first acknowledge that the VCCR creates individually
enforceable rights. Whatever the proper remedy, the United States' treat-
ment of the ICJ's decisions has definite negative impacts on its relationship
with other signatory countries that probably are not outweighed by any
perceived benefit of judicial independence.
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